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CHAPTER 10
Fictitious Speeches, Envy, and the Habituation to 
Authority: Writing the Collapse of the Roman 
Republic
Christopher Burden-Strevens*
The surviving speeches of Cassius Dio’s Roman History have not traditionally 
been enthusiastically received. The historian visibly imitated the language and 
style of Demosthenes and Thucydides.1 Often his orators appear to make little 
detailed reference to the speciĳic historical context.2 Certain of them simply do 
not ‘sound’ Roman, and would seem more at home in the Athenian democracy 
than in the internecine conflicts of the Late Republic.3 And, as Andriy Fomin 
shows, the content of Dio’s speeches was demonstrably informed by the pre-
liminary exercises (progymnasmata) of the Imperial schools of rhetoric. The 
view expressed by Millar in his landmark study, that the speeches are banal 
expositions of commonplace moral ideas which characterise Dio’s work as a 
whole, has been influential.4 As Barbara Saylor Rodgers has recently remarked, 
these compositions appear to serve the historian’s philosophical or moralising 
proclivities better than they serve history.5
These considerations, particularly on Dio’s relationship with Classical 
models and with the progymnasmata, are important aspects of the historian’s 
speechwriting. Certainly he wished to demonstrate his culture (παιδεία), par-
ticularly writing during a self-consciously intellectual period.6 But Dio also had 
* I am grateful to C. Hjort Lange and J. Majbom Madsen for arranging the conference at which 
I presented an earlier version of this paper, and for their considerate approach to its revisions 
in the editorial stage. Further thanks are also due to the reviewers for their invaluable cor-
rections and suggestions. Translations are my own unless otherwise speciĳied and preferred 
book numbers are those of Carey’s LCL edition.
1   Vlachos 1905; Saylor Rodgers 2008, 313–318.
2   Millar 1964, 78–83; Gowing 1992, 243–244.
3   Greenhalgh 1980, 88; McKechnie 1981.
4   Millar 1964, 49–55, 78–83.
5   Saylor Rodgers 2008, 297.
6   Brandon Jones contribution to this volume in particular gives a good overview in which 
Cassius Dio may be considered a member of a ‘sophistic’ intellectual climate. His attitude 
to the sophists and to centres of sophistic activity in the Greek East seems to me very often 
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his own story to tell about how and why the Republic collapsed, and despite 
the considerable bibliography on the speeches, remarkably little work has 
been undertaken on how he used speeches to tell that story.7 Rhetoric was, 
fundamentally, a means of persuasion; this much was made clear to ancient 
authors even in school. Yet among the literature on Dio’s speeches, a question 
that seems to me important has met little attention: the question of how the 
historian used rhetoric to form a persuasive interpretation of why the Republic 
collapsed, and why the new Augustan regime was a successful replacement.8 
As he states himself, Cassius Dio ĳirmly believed that monarchy was the best 
form of government;9 and as such he was particularly interested in explaining 
how the Principate under which he lived came to be. Accordingly, he made the 
Late Republic the longest and most detailed section of his work.10 Although 
it is not commonly recognised (and occasionally rejected outright),11 Dio did 
apply a causative framework to that constitutional change; but a signiĳicant 
part of that, I suggest, can be very clearly identiĳied in the speeches.
In this paper I focus on two aspects of that framework. The ĳirst is the ‘habitu-
ation to authority’ (imperii consuetudo) which the historian viewed as the 
inevitable consequence of successive ofĳice-holding, and especially of military 
authority in the provinces. This phenomenon, Dio argues through his speech 
  hostile (Cass. Dio 52.30.3–10; 52.36.3–4; 52.37.9–10; 54.23.8; 72.53.1–2; 78[77].17.2; 
78[77].18.4; 78[77].19.1–2) although I do not think that this is inconsistent with Brandon 
Jones’ point. Dio criticised squabbling poleis, witchcraft, sophistry, and false philosophers, 
but not the intellectual milieu in which he lived.
7    The analysis of Fechner 1986 is the ĳirst serious attempt to unearth the causal, histori-
cal, and theoretical framework contained within Dio’s speeches by considering them in 
relation to the narrative that surrounds them. However, while Fechner examined these 
compositions innovatively to ĳind that framework, he did not set out how Dio used his 
speeches to explain the causal effect it exerted upon historical events. For this thesis, see 
Burden-Strevens 2015a.
8    Giua 1983; Reinhold 1988, 12; Reinhold and Swan 1990; and Swan 2004, 13–17 point out the 
positivity of Dio’s presentation of the Augustan Principate.
9    Cass. Dio 44.2.1. He presents its counterpart in the Republic (called δημοκρατία in his work 
and in Appian, for which see Aalders 1986, 296–299; Freyburger-Galland, 1997, 116–123) as 
untenable, at least in the ĳirst century BCE. But as Kemezis 2014, 129 has recently observed, 
by the historian’s time monarchy had ‘long ceased to be something one was for or against’.
10   Swan 1997, 2533 shows that the number of years per book increases signiĳicantly after 
Augustus’ rule; his account of the Late Republic was far more detailed and less compressed.
11   Pace Millar 1964, 46, 77, 115, who writes that Cassius Dio had no general historical views 
whatsoever, was not profound or original in his approach, and did not have an overarch-
ing or consistent interpretation of the causes for the decline of the Republic. Millar’s 
remains the most influential study of Dio.
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of Q. Lutatius Catulus, engendered monarchical ambitions in all the major 
military ĳigures of the Late Republic, whose repeated positions of authority 
made them addicted to power. The second is the proliferation of envy (φθóνος) 
as a motivating factor in the hostile actions of the senatorial elite. The histo-
rian suggests through a patchwork of speeches that this factor was no mere 
commonplace, but was deeply embedded in his historical perspective on Late 
Republican aristocratic discord. Importantly, Dio used the Agrippa-Maecenas 
debate of Book 52 to reflect upon both of these issues, and to suggest his 
own interpretation of the measures necessary in the new regime to counter 
them. My focus throughout will not be on the content of the speeches per se, 
but on how this content is consonant with Dio’s authorial comments elsewhere; 
on how the speeches relate to one another in their argumentation; and on how 
both elements, speech and narrative, were arranged in a particular order to 
build a persuasive argument about the drivers of constitutional change over 
many books, which, growing cumulatively more convincing, culminates with 
the Augustan Principate.
 Imperii Consuetudo
I begin with imperii consuetudo. The phrase ĳirst appears a century before 
Dio, in Suetonius’ biography of Julius Caesar. “Some”, he writes, “think that 
Caesar was overcome by his habituation to his own authority (captum imperii 
consuetudine) and that, when he had weighed up his own strength and that of 
his enemies, he embraced the opportunity to seize power”.12 Perhaps this was 
obvious to Suetonius. By the time of the Civil War, Caesar had been in posses-
sion of imperium for a period of thirteen years: praetor, governor of Lusitania, 
consul, and then proconsul in Gaul for eight years. Commanding had simply 
become his habit (consuetudo), and he was loath to give it up.13 As Eckstein 
argues, the experience of governing a province for years at a time, with abso-
lute authority and far from senatorial oversight, inevitably caused the expan-
sion of Caesar’s ambitions in particular. He had become addicted to power, 
and this was directly caused by the way that the Republic organised its empire, 
with frequent over-reliance upon individual commanders.14
In Dio’s view, Caesar was not the exception in the Late Republic, but the 
rule. For him, the problem of imperii consuetudo originated long before 
12   Suet. Iul. 30.5.
13   App. B Civ. 2.28 makes a similar suggestion.
14   Eckstein 2004, esp. 285. See also Crawford 2008, 631–643.
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the Civil War of 49–45 BCE.15 It was a key factor in the downfall of the Republic. 
But it is in three speeches, and not solely in narrative, that Dio most clearly 
elucidates that argument.
To begin with the ĳirst, in the oration of Q. Lutatius Catulus (36.31–36) the 
historian sets out his interpretation of the causes of imperii consuetudo and 
explores its ramiĳications for the Republic. This speech, placed within Dio’s 
account of the year 67 BCE, is framed as a vehement rejection of the contro-
versial lex Gabinia, proposed by the tribune A. Gabinius to rectify the issue of 
Mediterranean piracy. The pirate problem had grown to extraordinary dimen-
sions, and in consequence called for an extraordinary solution: a grant of pro-
consular imperium for a period of three years over the entire Mediterranean 
and ĳifty miles into the littoral, with a vast army and fleet at the chosen com-
mander’s disposal.16 In Dio’s account of this episode, both Pompeius and 
Gabinius are ĳirst made to give short speeches in the contio – the former disin-
genuously pretending to reject the command, the latter exhorting the people 
to ratify it – before the set-piece of Catulus, longer than the ĳirst two speeches 
combined.
Amongst this trio, Dio brings Catulus’ to the fore not only by its length, but 
its credibility. Shortly before Pompeius and Gabinius are made to speak, Dio 
underlines in the narrative that both were motivated purely by self-interest.17 
This authoritative preface directs our negative reading of these disingenuous 
speeches. In the prefatory remarks prior to the speech of Catulus, however, 
the orator is described favourably as “one who always spoke and acted for the 
people’s advantage”, and Catulus correspondingly begins in the proemium by 
underlining his devotion to the state.18 In this way we are actively directed to 
read what follows as a trustworthy piece of analysis. This method of furnishing 
the reader with a guiding preface to a speech is common in Dio’s technique.19 
15   Of course Dio does not use this Latin term, nor ĳinds a simple Greek expression to denote 
“habituation to authority”; but his Greek expressions such as “ruling successively” (κατὰ 
τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς) and “for many years in succession” (τοσούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἔτεσι) capture the sense 
of the historical problem.
16   Ferrary 2007 gives an overview of the terms of the law and our sources. For the nature of 
Pompeius’ imperium in 67 BCE, see Jameson 1970. On Pompeius’ military career in general 
and his use of deception before the people to further this, as in Dio, see Vervaet 2009, 2010; 
van der Blom 2011.
17   Cass. Dio 36.23.4–5; 36.24.5–6.
18   Cass. Dio 36.30.5–31.1. See also the favourable necrology of Catulus at 37.46.3.
19   Cass. Dio 38.35.1–3 (Caesar at Vesontio); 41.26.1–2 (Caesar at Placentia); 41.15.1–2 (Caesar 
in the Senate); 53.2.6–7 (Augustus in the Senate). In each case, our reading of the speech, 
generally negative, is directly informed by Dio’s comments.
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But it is especially important in this case. Dio is not merely acknowledging the 
encomiastic tradition of writing Catulus as the ideal Republican  statesman.20 
Here, he ensures that the argument about imperii consuetudo which his 
speaker will raise cannot be doubted on the basis of character. This is particu-
larly important in that Catulus’ speech is the ĳirst elaboration of this problem. 
An unconvincing exposition here would render Dio’s comments on imperii 
consuetudo unpersuasive later.
Having laid this foundation, Dio’s Catulus moves on from the proemium 
to the ĳirst of three argumentative sections. The ĳirst maintains that the lex 
Gabinia is forbidden by law (36.31.3–32.3). The second, that the extraordi-
nary new powers enshrined in it are unnecessary as long as other imperium- 
holders exist (36.33.1–34.4). And the third, that the proposed command would 
be better exercised by a number of generals directly answerable to the people 
(36.35.1–36.4). Although the title of each of these headings is debatable, this 
is cosmetic.21 All three sections have at their heart the fundamental question 
of imperii consuetudo in Dio’s history: the effect of prolonged power upon the 
individual and upon the res publica. The opening to Catulus’ ĳirst section is 
worth quoting in full:
ἐγὼ τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μάλιστά φημι δεῖν μηδενὶ ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ τοσαύτας κατὰ 
τὸ ἑξῆς ἀρχὰς ἐπιτρέπειν. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἀπηγόρευται καὶ πείρᾳ 
σφαλερώτατον ὂν πεφώραται. οὔτε γὰρ τὸν Μάριον ἄλο τι ὡς εἰπεῖν τοιοῦτον 
ἐποίησεν ἢ ὅτι τοσούτους τε ἐν ὀλιγίστῳ χρόνῳ πολέμους ἐνεχειρίσθη καὶ 
ὕπατος ἑξάκις ἐν βραχυτάτῳ ἐγένετο, οὔτε τὸν Σύλαν ἢ ὅτι τοσούτοις ἐφεξῆς 
ἔτεσι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν στρατοπέδων ἔσχε καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δικτάτωρ, εἶθ᾽ ὕπατος 
ἀπεδείχθη. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ψυχήν, μὴ ὅτι νέαν ἀλὰ 
καὶ πρεσβυτέραν, ἐν ἐξουσίαις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐνδιατρίψασαν τοῖς πατρίοις 
ἔθεσιν ἐθέλειν ἐμμένειν.
First and most importantly, I say that we should never entrust so many 
commands to a single man, one after another. For this is not only forbidden 
by law, but has been found to be very dangerous in our experience. Nothing 
else made Marius ‘what he was’, so to speak, except being entrusted with 
so many wars in the shortest space of time and being made consul six times 
20   Amply represented at: Cic. Brut. 133, 222; Phil. 2.12; Leg. Man. 51; Red. sen. 9; Sest. 122; Vell. 
Pat. 2.31–32; Plut. Pomp. 16.1, 17.3; possibly Sall. Hist. 5 frg. 23, though it is not clear whether 
the fragment actually refers to Catulus as Gelzer 1943, 180 suggests.
21   Jameson 1970, 546 and Fechner 1986, 45–46 both deĳine these three sections slightly 
differently.
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in the briefest period. Nor Sulla, except that he commanded our armies for 
so many years in succession and after this was made dictator, then consul. 
For it is not in human nature, not only in the youthful spirit but the elder 
too, to wish to abide by the customs of our ancestors when one has been 
in power for a long time.22
According to Dio’s speaker, the lust for power that led Marius and Sulla to 
seize control could be explained as the direct result of Rome’s over-reliance 
upon their skills. Historically, C. Marius owed his six consulships in the period 
107–101 BCE to the threat of Jugurtha in Numidia and a possible Cimbrian 
invasion. L. Cornelius Sulla took continual charge of the First Mithridatic War 
between 87–83 BCE before serving as dictator and then consul in the two fol-
lowing years, as Dio’s Catulus outlines here.23 The fact that the lex Villia effec-
tively forbade successive ofĳice-holding (which the historian may be hinting 
at in this passage) did not prevent this. Whether this is the ĳirst point at which 
the historian explicitly states that Marius’ and Sulla’s protracted periods of 
authority made them seek absolute power is unclear, as his narrative of their 
careers is extremely fragmentary. Is this explanation of the cause of Marian 
and Sullan tyranny merely a representation of what the historian believed to 
be the standard or commonplace views of a Republican optimas objecting 
to unconstitutional powers?24 Or, is Dio using his speaker to articulate his own 
historical interpretation about the destructive role of imperii consuetudo in the 
Late Republic?
Earlier fragments on Sulla suggest the latter. In the aftermath of the battle 
of the Colline Gate, Dio describes the shift in Sulla’s character following his 
victory over the Marians. Although he had once been considered the “foremost 
in humanity and piety”, Sulla was transformed by his victory. It seemed as if 
he had left behind his former self, in Dio’s own words, outside the city walls, 
and proceeded to outdo Cinna and Marius in brutality.25 Prior to this time he 
had relied upon good men; “but when he grew closer to his desire of absolute 
conquest, he considered their advice of no worth, and placed his trust instead 
in the basest”. Although Dio concedes that his longing for power may have 
lay dormant from the beginning, his interpretation in these passages is clear: 
22   Cass. Dio 36.31.3–4.
23   Although the precise date of Sulla’s resignation of the dictatorship is debatable, see 
Hinard, 1999 for a recent analysis with accompanying bibliography. Hinard suggests an 
early date of resignation, within the permitted six-month term.
24   Leach 1978, 68.
25   Cass. Dio frg. 109.1–3.
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it was closeness to power, Sulla’s experience of absolute conquest (τοῦ παντελῶς 
κρατήσειν), that corrupted his character and made him institute a tyranny over 
the Republic.26
Dio plays out a similar argument in his narrative of Caesar’s third consecu-
tive term as dictator and consul in 46 BCE, though in more prosaic language. 
Caesar’s reforms to the provincial administration, the historian states, were 
informed by the experience of his own career:
ὅτι τε αὐτὸς πολοῖς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφεξῆς ἔτεσιν ἄρξας ἔς τε τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν 
ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τῆς δυναστείας μᾶλον προήχθη καὶ ἐς τὴν παρασκευὴν τῆς ἰσχύος 
ἐπηυξήθη, κατέκλεισε νόμῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐστρατηγηκότας ἐπ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν τοὺς δὲ 
ὑπατευκότας ἐπὶ δύο ἔτη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς ἄρχειν, καὶ μηδενὶ τὸ παράπαν ἐπὶ 
πλεῖον ἡγεμονίαν τινὰ ἔχειν ἐξεῖναι.
Because he himself had ruled the Gauls for many years in succession and 
as a result of this had been led to desire absolute power and to increase his 
military might, he limited by law the term of propraetors to one year and 
proconsuls to two consecutive years, ruling that absolutely no one be per-
mitted to hold any command for a longer time than this.27
Two accounts of this law survive which predate Dio: Cicero’s First Philippic and 
Suetonius Life of Julius Caesar.28 Mention of the dictator’s previous career is 
absent in these. Although it is likely that the historian read both,29 Dio is our 
only ancient author who argues that Caesar’s own experience of ruling Gaul 
precipitated his reassertion in 46 BCE that commanders ought not to wield 
power over extended periods. In Dio’s view, continual military authority had 
habituated Caesar to his own power and led him to desire monarchy. He there-
fore moved to prevent anyone following in his footsteps. Catulus’ reflection on 
the careers of Marius and Sulla therefore looks forward as well as back, crys-
tallising the historical problem of imperii consuetudo into a single persuasive 
26   Cass. Dio frg. 108.1.
27   Cass. Dio 43.25.3.
28   Cic. Phil. 1.9; Suet. Iul. 42.1–3.
29   Dio’s use of the Philippics is commonly attested in older scholarship, for which see Fischer 
1870; Haupt 1884, 688–690; Gabba 1957; Millar 1964, 53–54. For a more detailed rhetorical 
analysis of the historian’s use of Cicero, see Burden-Strevens (2015a) 47–72, with Burden-
Strevens (forthcoming 2017a) for comments also on his re-elaboration of Cicero’s letters. 
On the complexities of Dio’s relationship with Suetonius, see Millar 1964, 85–87, 105; 
Manuwald 1979, 260–268; Rich 1989; Swan 1987; Swan 1997.
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moment which applies not only to Caesar as Suetonius wrote, but to earlier 
generals too.
Dio’s Catulus opens the second section of his speech by reiterating that his 
ĳirst argument, that power ought not to be concentrated repeatedly in one 
man’s hands, is the most important of all.30 But this next section asserts that 
the unconstitutional powers of the lex Gabinia were in any case not required, 
as the usual system of propraetors and proconsuls functioned perfectly well. 
“For why bother to elect the annual magistrates at all”, Catulus asks, “if you are 
not going to make use of them for such tasks? Surely not just so they can go 
about in purple-bordered togas?”31 It is possible that Dio imitates Demosthenes 
in this thought,32 although it is revealing, in the context of Catulus’ rejection 
of Pompeius’ power, that the purple toga is particularly relevant to Pompeius: 
Cicero in a letter to Atticus quips that “our good pal Pompeius is protecting 
that little purple toga of his (togulam illam pictam) with his silence”.33
More of interest to the problem of imperii consuetudo is the point that the 
speaker raises in this section about the dictatorship. He states that, if the pirate 
problem required far-reaching powers, a dictator could be appointed. Dio 
makes this argument deliberately illogical: such a person, Catulus observes, 
would have to ĳight the pirates from Italy, as the law required that dictatores 
remain there.34 The historical message made implicit in this by Dio is that the 
supreme emergency power of the Republic was unable to respond to the needs 
of the newly-enlarged empire, thereby necessitating the monarchy. Again, 
this laboured focus upon the dictatorship returns to the destructive impact of 
imperii consuetudo:
πῶς δ᾽ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι καινὴν ἡγεμονίαν, καὶ ταύτην ἐς ἔτη τρία καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν 
ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἔξω πράγμασιν, ἀποδειχθῆναι; ὅσα γὰρ 
ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου δεινὰ ταῖς πόλεσι συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅσοι διὰ τὰς παρανόμους 
φιλαρχίας τόν τε δῆμον ἡμῶν πολάκις ἐτάραξαν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς μυρία κακὰ 
εἰργάσαντο, πάντες ὁμοίως ἐπίστασθε.
30   Cass. Dio 36.33.1.
31   Cass. Dio 36.33.2.
32   Saylor Rodgers 2008, 315 places this passage alongside Dem. 4.26, although there is lit-
tle similarity between the two beside the fact that both argue that ofĳicials ought to be 
allowed to do their jobs, and verbal parallels are very few.
33   Cic. Att. 1.18.6.
34   Cass. Dio 36.34.2.
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How can it be right that a new command be created, and that for three 
years and over all affairs within Italy, without Italy, and, in a word, over 
everything? For I think that you all know how many disasters come to 
states from this practice, and how many men have often disturbed our peo-
ple and wrought incalculable harm upon themselves because of their lust 
for extra-legal powers.35
By this point Dio’s readers have seen for themselves the validity of this state-
ment. Though fragmentary, the earlier narrative of Marius and Sulla’s control 
over Rome is discernibly savage. Here again Catulus lights upon the problem 
not only of great authority, but of great authority over a protracted period of 
time, and the deleterious consequences of “this practice” (ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου). 
Allowing ambitious commanders to become habituated to the experience 
of wielding power had, and would again, upset the harmony of the state. The 
existing yearly magistrates should be maintained, and no single person should 
have too much power, especially military power. Dio conĳirms later in his nar-
rative of events following Caesar’s infamous “funeral” in the Forum that this 
argument of Catulus is his own. The historian simply lists the events here, 
except for one: the lex Antonia, M. Antonius’ law abolishing the dictatorship. 
Dio viewed this as especially misguided: “for they passed this law for posterity, 
thinking that the disgrace of men’s actions lay in their titles; but in fact, those 
actions arise from their possession of armed forces (ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων)”.36 In the 
context of the lex Antonia this is a reflection upon Caesar in particular. But 
Catulus speech makes clear that to Dio, Caesar was merely a further iteration 
of a problem which went further back, to Marius and Sulla: of individual com-
manders holding military power for long periods.
The third section underscores this argument about imperii consuetudo a ĳinal 
time. But it is also used by Dio to set a chain-reaction into motion which, in the 
historian’s view, culminated two decades after the lex Gabinia with the defeat 
of Pompeius at Pharsalus and the inception of Caesar’s monarchy.37 Marianne 
Coudry’s contribution to this volume rightly explores Dio’s presentation of the 
lex Gabinia in institutional terms as a turning point in the Republican consti-
tution. But the historian also judged the consequences of the law of 67 BCE in 
35   Cass. Dio 36.34.3–4.
36   Cass. Dio 44.51.3.
37   I use the loaded term “monarchy” as a reflection of what Cass. Dio himself calls Caesar’s 
rule at 44.2, but see Carson (1957) and Rawson (1975) for other views on Caesar’s position 
in the few years leading up to 44 BCE.
Burden-Strevens202
For use by the Author only | © 2016 Koninklijke Brill NV
strongly moral terms – ones which had signiĳicant historical consequences, as 
his Catulus predicts.
τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἄλως καλῶς ἔχει οὔτε συμφέρει ἑνί τινι τὰ 
πράγματα προστάσσεσθαι καὶ ἕνα τινὰ πάντων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν 
κύριον γίγνεσθαι, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα ἄριστός τις ᾖ; αἵ τε γὰρ μεγάλαι τιμαὶ καὶ αἱ 
ὑπέρογκοι ἐξουσίαι καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐπαίρουσι καὶ διαφθείρουσιν.
Who does not know that it is neither remotely appropriate nor advanta-
geous to entrust all our business to one man, or for any one man to be 
master of all our possessions, even if he is the most excellent? Great hon-
ours and excessive powers exalt, and then destroy, even such excellent men.38
As I outlined earlier, the reader has already observed the truth of this in the 
now fragmentary accounts of Marius and Sulla. In Dio’s assessment, the char-
acter of Sulla in particular was exalted by his great and continual power, and 
then destroyed by that same agency. Dio’s argument in this passage is that 
granting Pompeius yet another position of great authority, enshrined in the 
lex Gabinia, would make him as habituated to his own power as his predeces-
sors, exalting and ultimately destroying him. The Republic would again suffer 
as a result.
This is precisely what the later consequences of Pompeius’ imperii 
consuetudo turn out to be. In his prefatory comments before the narrative 
of the battle of Pharsalus, Dio outlines that both Pompeius and Caesar were 
ambitious for absolute power.39 His reflection on their respective careers at this 
point is interesting, and I think relevant. He envisages the pair enumerating 
their former achievements, Pompeius thinking of Africa, Sertorius, Mithridates, 
and his pirate command, and Caesar of Gaul, Spain, the crossing of the 
Rhine, and the expedition to Britain. “And thinking, indeed, that all those 
achievements were at stake, and each being eager to appropriate the other’s 
glory, they were most excited”.40 The pair were thus incited to battle, and 
indeed to the civil war, by their long and glorious careers. Caesar, Dio states, 
had no intention of becoming a private citizen again after “commanding for 
such a long time” (ἐκ χρονίου ἡγεμονίας);41 but Pompeius, too, had been simi-
larly corrupted by his imperii consuetudo. Too corrupted, in fact, even to win 
38   Cass. Dio 36.35.1.
39   Cass. Dio 41.53.2.
40   Cass. Dio 41.56.2–3.
41   Cass. Dio 40.60.1.
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at Pharsalus. Dio’s  interpretation of the battle makes clear that Pompeius lost 
not because of a tactical error, but because of his complacency: in view of his 
career, he expected an easy conquest and took victory for granted.42 The lex 
Gabinia, the historian argues through Catulus, was instrumental in Pompeius’ 
moral decline and failure to save the Republic at Pharsalus – though we are not 
supposed to believe he was even trying. Dio places Pompeius in a continuum 
of ambitious generals whose lengthy tenure of military authority corrupted 
and destroyed both them and the res publica.
One view accepts that the oration of Catulus appears to elucidate the his-
torical situation more effectively than Dio’s other speeches.43 I think that we 
can go further than this. The composition seems to me a careful exploration of 
a fundamental problem in the organisation of military power under the Late 
Republic as Dio perceived it. Dio achieves this, on the one hand, by simply 
having his speaker state views which are his own: for example, on the role of 
successive and lengthy periods of authority in the degeneration of Marius and 
Sulla. On the other hand, I posit that the historian expects his readers to recall 
the speech of Catulus at later points in the narrative, in for example his own 
comments on Caesar’s motivation in limiting the tenure of pro-magistracies, 
or on the lex Antonia. Catulus’ recurring argument on the destructive role 
of imperii consuetudo in the Late Republic functions, on the one hand, as a 
standalone set-piece on the dangers of prolonged personal power. But within 
the broader narrative context, it is also clear that the concerns voiced by 
Dio’s Catulus apply to all the major military actors of this period. The speech 
of Catulus, ĳictitious though it may be,44 is the author’s method of exploring 
the historical problem of imperii consuetudo and of persuading his readers 
of the validity of his interpretation.
How, then, to prevent imperii consuetudo among the commanders of the 
regime that followed the Republic? Manuwald’s analysis of Dio’s treatment 
of Octavian-Augustus ĳinds the lack of positive or negative extremes rather 
bland, and his necrology of the ĳirst princeps a sober, albeit generally positive, 
42   Cass. Dio 42.1.1–2.1.
43   Millar 1961, 15 n. 46.
44   Although the speech of Catulus is clearly Dio’s own composition, it is also evident that he 
drew a number of key arguments from the De Imperio of Cicero, as Van Ooteghem 1954, 
170 n. 1; Saylor Rodgers 2008, 308–313; and Kemezis 2014, 113 n. 53 have briefly noted. It is 
not clear, in fact, whether Catulus actually spoke in 67 BCE as Vell. Pat. 2.32.1–3, Val. Max. 
8.15.9, Plut. Pomp. 25.5–6, and Cass. Dio suggest. However, it is clear that the evidence of 
Cicero alone is not sufĳicient to assert with Saylor Rodgers 2008 that Catulus did not speak 
in 67 BCE; for the detail, see Burden-Strevens (2015a) 47–49.
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 summary.45 Perhaps so, but it is hardly possible to escape the idea that the his-
torian treated the Augustan Principate as an enlightened example of effective 
monarchy,46 especially in contradistinction to the turpitude of the δημοκρατία 
which immediately preceded it. But even that change, certainly for the better 
in the historian’s assessment, could not in itself directly address all the flaws 
of the res publica.
Dio’s hortatory speeches of Agrippa and Maecenas suggest that in his inter-
pretation the key lay in Augustus’ reforms to the provincial administration. 
The Agrippa-Maecenas debate is framed as a controversia: after being called 
by Augustus to deliberate with him on the future of the constitution, Agrippa 
argues for the restitution of the Republic, and Maecenas for the return of the 
monarchy. The two speeches seem to be the historian’s own fabrication; Dio 
may have drawn inspiration for the role at least of Agrippa from a literary tra-
dition which depicted him arguing for the restoration of the republic.47 Even 
so, Dio again uses these speeches to persuade the reader of the gravity of the 
problem of imperii consuetudo in the Late Republic, and posits effective solu-
tions in the speech of Maecenas.
First Dio’s Agrippa in his rejection of monarchy outlines the key issue that 
the absolute ruler would have to face: men who are naturally proud detest the 
rule of another on principle.48 This would be problematic: “for if the monarch 
allows these to grow in strength, he cannot live in safety; but if he tries to cur-
tail them, he cannot do so justly. What will you do with them, then?”.49 Worse 
still, such men would have to be sent out to the provinces, far from the mon-
arch’s oversight. Augustus, Dio argues through his speaker, could not manage 
the empire alone:
καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὐτὸς μόνος πρός τε τὸ τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰ πολεμικὰ καλῶς 
καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν πράττειν ἐξήρκεις, καὶ μηδενὸς συνεργοῦ πρὸς μηδὲν αὐτῶν 
45   Manuwald 1979, 273–276.
46   As Millar 1964, 100–105; Manuwald 1979, 273–284; Giua 1983, 441–450, 445–456 discuss, 
Dio’s presentation of Augustus is not uniform. In particular, as Reinhold 1988, 13 spells 
out, Dio seems to have endorsed Augustus as an emperor, but not approved of his earlier 
incarnation, Octavian, as a Late Republican dynast. In this connection, Rich 1989, 96–97 
states that it is a mistake to view the historian’s presentation of Octavian as particularly 
hostile in any case, as the Senate and tyrannicides were the ones to blame in Dio’s view. 
Rich furthermore concludes at 101–102 that to Dio, Augustus was “a model emperor both 
at home and abroad”.
47   Millar 1964, 105, Reinhold 1988, 166–167; Rich 1989, 98–99.
48   Cass. Dio 52.8.1.
49   Cass. Dio 52.8.1.
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ἔχρῃζες, ἕτερος ἂν ἦν λόγος: νῦν δὲ πᾶσά σε ἀνάγκη συναγωνιστὰς πολούς, 
ἅτε τοσαύτης οἰκουμένης ἄρχοντα, ἔχειν, καὶ προσήκει που πάντας αὐτοὺς καὶ 
ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους εἶναι. οὐκοῦν ἂν μὲν τοιούτοις τισὶ τά τε στρατεύματα 
καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζῃς, κίνδυνος ἔσται καὶ σοὶ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ καταλυθῆναι.
For if you alone were enough to respond properly both to political and 
military circumstances and didn’t need assistants to help in any of them, 
then that’d be a different story. But as it is, you will need to have many 
helpers in governing so great an empire, and those must all of course be 
brave and spirited. And so, if you entrust armies and ofĳices to such men 
as these, both you and your government will be in danger of overthrow.50
Of course this applies to the Late Republic more than any other period in 
Dio’s narrative. The reader cannot fail to think of Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, and 
Caesar as examples of generals in the empire who attempted to overthrow the 
government. Indeed, the speaker later uses these precise exempla.51 Agrippa’s 
argument on the relative danger of monarchy compared to Republicanism is 
deliberately illogical on the historian’s part, but not because the speech acts 
as a cosmetic prelude to the main feature of Maecenas.52 Rather, Dio sug-
gests through Agrippa that imperii consuetudo would always be an issue when 
the strong are given military authority far from the city of Rome, regardless 
of the constitution. It certainly had been under the Republic, which Dio’s 
Agrippa idealises into unpersuasive fantasy.
The historian interpreted the solution to the problem through his Maecenas. 
The speech has traditionally been examined as a political pamphlet on Dio’s 
part, an essay on effective monarchy third century CE.53 This was surely 
one aspect; but it additionally serves an explanatory purpose. Augustus, the 
speaker advises, should neutralise the fractious elements in the senatorial 
class by simply hand-picking them himself. He advises ĳirstly that Augustus 
cleanse the Senate of unsavoury ĳigures and install loyal aristocrats in their 
place: “for in this way, you will have many assistants and secure the loyalty of 
the leading provincials; and the provinces, having no reputable leaders, will 
50   Cass. Dio 52.8.3–4.
51   Cass. Dio 52.13.2–4.
52   For this point see Gabba 1955, 316; McKechnie 1981, 150.
53   Hammond 1932; Gabba 1955, 320–322; Bleicken 1962; Reinhold 1988, 182–183; Dorandi 
1985. Kuhlmann 2013, 110–112 has also recently returned to the very familiar topic of the 
speech’s anachronisms.
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not cause political uprisings”.54 Secondly, Augustus should appoint magistrates 
and governors himself. This, Maecenas argues, would prevent “the same things 
happening all over again” (ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ αὖθις γένηται) and give ambitious com-
manders neither reason nor opportunity to again march on Rome.55 Finally – 
and crucially – Maecenas insists on a long hiatus between a magistrate’s tenure 
in the city and his position of command abroad. Pro-magistrates should not 
go out immediately after their urban ofĳice, but should wait: “for after being 
private citizens for a time, they will be milder, and, not having been placed in 
command of legions alongside the prestige of their titles, they will not rebel”.56 
Maecenas’ recommendations of Book 52 are framed as a response to the Late 
Republican problem of individual commanders growing habituated to their 
own authority by long periods in power.
This is exactly the interpretation that the historian applies to Augustus’ 
reforms to the provincial administration in 27 BCE in Book 53. Dio writes that 
the new princeps feigned a reluctant acceptance of the absolute power offered 
to him by the Senate,57 and, wishing to appear “democratic” (δημοτικός), 
declared that he would not govern all the provinces himself. Instead, he made 
some senatorial, and others imperial, entrusting to the Senate the weaker prov-
inces, “on the pretext that they were safer and peaceful and not at war”, but to 
himself the stronger provinces. Dio’s analysis is incisive: “he said that he was 
taking this course so that the Senate might enjoy the best of the empire with-
out fear while he himself would have all the hardships and dangers. In reality, it 
was so that under this pretext the Senate would be unarmed and feeble, while 
he alone would have arms and maintain troops” (αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ μόνος καὶ ὅπλα ἔχῃ 
καὶ στρατιώτας τρέφῃ.).58 To complete the package, Augustus decreed that the 
governors of the imperial provinces be selected by the princeps himself, while 
those of the senatorial provinces be chosen at random, by lot – thereby impos-
ing his direct control over the stronger territories.59 Against the backdrop of 
Maecenas’ recommendations, Dio’s interpretation of Augustus’ provincial 
reforms is signiĳicant. The historian implicitly frames these measures as a pre-
ventative response to the problem of military authority under the Republic, 
which the reader has to this point seen played out numerous times.
54   Cass. Dio 52.19.3.
55   Cass. Dio 52.20.3.
56   Cass. Dio 52.20.4.
57   See Rich 2010 and Vervaet 2010 on Augustan recusatio imperii.
58   Cass. Dio 53.12.1–3.
59   Cass. Dio 53.13.2–5. For a discussion of the relationship between the princeps and the pro-
consuls, see Hurlet 2006.
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So Catulus’ dissuasio of Pompeius’ pirate command and the Agrippa-
Maecenas debate seem to form a logical unity, one which book-ends a Late 
Republican narrative in which imperii consuetudo is of fundamental histori-
cal importance. An historical analysis is being formed. By reflecting on imperii 
consuetudo as one of the dangers of monarchy, Agrippa is in fact made to reit-
erate, implicitly, the consequences of this problem in the Republic. The reader 
has by this point already seen these grave consequences reflected on, and pre-
dicted further, in the speech of Catulus. Maecenas, by way of response, verbal-
ises the historian’s interpretation of the measures necessary to address that 
issue. And, ĳinally, Dio’s own later account of Augustus’ reforms spells out how 
the new princeps, by acting in accordance with Maecenas’ recommendations, 
was able to prevent strong and independently-minded provincial governors 
from becoming habituated to power. Dio’s is a convincing exploration of the 
problem of imperii consuetudo over a span of twenty books, and the speeches 
played a considerable role in that argument.
 Φθóνος
Dio also devotes considerable attention in his speeches to the problem of 
spiteful envy (φθóνος) in the Late Republic.60 It is easy to dismiss this focus. 
On the one hand, the suggestion that successful political ĳigures would incur 
the jealousy of their competitors was commonplace enough, and this may 
be the reason that remarkably little research has been undertaken on the 
prominence of φθóνος as a factor of history in Dio’s work.61 On the other, tradi-
tions of Late Republican moral decline were naturally canonical in the histo-
riography of this period, and easy enough to replicate. Sallust’s portrait of the 
political culture of the 60s depicts an aristocracy in a state of endemic invidia 
that is only momentarily set aside with the temporary return of metus hostilis 
in Catilina.62 Not that Sallust, who by critiquing the turpitude of his contempo-
raries “inscribed his own condemnation all too well in the pages of his history”,63 
60   On the spiteful connotations of φθóνος as distinct from other signiĳiers of jealousy 
(νέμεσις), see Kaster 2003.
61   Although see some brief comments in Kemezis 2014, 110–115 and in Marianne Coudry’s 
contribution to this volume.
62   Sall. Cat. 23. As both Sallust (Cat. 10.3) and Tacitus (Hist. 2.38) attribute Late Republican 
moral decline to the disappearance of metus hostilis, the inverse in 63 BCE is not a surpris-
ing point to make.
63   Cass. Dio. 43.9.3.
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was too  sententious to accept the corrupting influence of invidia even upon 
himself, as he admits in his preface.64 But the causal ramiĳications of φθóνος 
were a signiĳicant motivating factor in the decline of the Republic in Dio’s 
view, even in spite of the time-honoured place of envy as an historiographical 
topos.65 As the historian again uses his speeches to elucidate his interpretation 
not only of the role of φθóνος in internecine conflict and its consequences, but 
also of the alleviation of this problem by the Augustan Principate, it merits 
consideration here.
I wish to dwell on Catulus and the other speeches surrounding the lex 
Gabinia a moment longer. As we have seen, in Catulus the historian foreshad-
owed the later consequences of Pompeius’ extraordinary position. Like Marius 
and Sulla before him, the general was corrupted by power, leading not only 
to his destructive ambitions, but to his complacency and ultimate defeat at 
Pharsalus. In the same fashion, Catulus’ oration against the lex Gabinia makes 
a further prediction: the gravity of the φθóνος that would result from further 
extraordinary powers. In one fragment of Book 36 attributed to the speech 
of Catulus, Dio’s speaker warns that Pompeius’ “monarchy” (μοναρχῆσαι) over 
all the Romans’ possessions “will not be free from envy” (οὔτε ἀνεπίφθονον 
ἔσται).66 Quite simply, further powers would be harmful not only to the res 
publica, but to the holder’s safety at the hands of his competitors. In fact Dio’s 
Catulus is merely rounding off a thought that had already been alluded to in 
the previous two speeches. Pompeius in his disingenuous rejection of power 
(recusatio imperii) declines the honour, on the grounds that “all such positions 
of power incur envy and hatred” (ἐπίφθονα καὶ μισητὰ).67 No man, he argues, 
could happily live among those who envy him (τίς μὲν γὰρ ἂν εὖ φρονῶν ἡδέως 
παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποις φθονοῦσιν αὐτῷ ζῴη;).68 The speech of Gabinius which fol-
lows builds on this theme: Dio’s speaker encourages Pompeius not to fear the 
64   Sall. Cat. 3.5: Quae tametsi animus aspernabatur insolens malarum artium, tamen inter 
tanta vitia imbecilla aetas ambitione corrupta tenebatur; ac me, cum ab reliquorum malis 
moribus dissentirem, nihilo minus honoris cupido eadem, qua ceteros, fama atque invidia 
vexabat.
65   And not only in the tradition that Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus represent; Harrison 2003 and 
Rees, W. 2011, 30–35 have shown the role played by φθóνος in Herodotus and Thucydides 
respectively.
66   Anecd. Bekk. 157, 30.
67   Cass. Dio 35.26.1. On Pompeius’ rhetorical strategies in the contio, see van der Blom 2011. 
For Pompeius’ recusatio imperii in particular, see Wallace-Hadrill 1982, 36; and Vervaet 
2010, who with Rich 2010 views Pompeius as the model for Augustus’ later adoption of the 
tactic.
68   Cass. Dio 35.26.2–3.
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envy of  others (μηδὲ ὅτι τινὲς φθονοῦσι φοβηθῇς), but to make even more of a 
success of the pirate command and thereby spite his competitors.69
The prediction of Dio’s Catulus again proves true. In Book 37, the historian 
narrates Pompeius’ victorious return from Asia Minor in 62 BCE. Landing at 
Brundisium like Sulla two decades before, Pompeius symbolically disbanded 
his legions, in order, Dio states, to avoid a repetition of the Sullan precedent.70 
Although he returned with a host of political settlements for the East,71 his 
measures were effectively blocked by his own favoured candidate for the con-
sulship of 60 BCE, Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer. Pompeius could accomplish 
nothing, and in Dio’s assessment the simple reason for this was φθóνος: after 
declaring that his enemies envied him and that he would communicate this to 
the people, “he realised that he was not actually powerful, but really possessed 
only the reputation and the envy for his previous positions” (τὸ μὲν ὄνομα καὶ 
τὸν φθόνον ἐφ᾽οἷς ἠδυνήθη ποτὲ εἶχεν).72 Simply put, in the historian’s view the 
lex Gabinia, as his Catulus and Pompeius expressed in advance, generated 
the φθóνος which led to Pompeius’ political impotence in 60 BCE. This envy, in 
fact, had farther-reaching consequences: Dio states explicitly that he entered 
the First Triumvirate that year to regain the political power he had recently 
lost,73 and it is hard not to think of the φθóνος of Metellus in this context.
Not that the case of Pompeius is the only example of Dio using his speeches 
to underline the historical ramiĳications of φθóνος in the Late Republic. In the 
wake of Caesar’s assassination, Dio inserts a speech into the mouth of Cicero, 
advocating an amnesty for the tyrannicides and the ratiĳication of the for-
mer dictator’s acts. Whether the historian drew some content from previous 
versions of a written Amnesty speech of Cicero is unclear, as none but Dio’s 
exists.74 It may be that the historian took only the historical occasion of speech 
and fabricated the content himself, with some references to Demosthenes, 
Thucydides, and the Athenian Amnesty of 403 BCE thrown in. Despite this, 
Dio’s speech of Cicero slots neatly into the interpretative framework that the 
historian applied to the downfall of the Late Republic because of its focus on 
69   Cass. Dio 36.29.2.
70   Cass. Dio 37.20.3.
71   See Steel 2013, 148–149 for a synopsis of these arrangements.
72   Cass. Dio 37.50.6.
73   Cass. Dio 37.56.3.
74   Cic. Phil. 1.1 and Att. 14.10 and 14.14 indicate that Cicero did speak publicly on March 17th 
44 BCE in favour of an amnesty. Vell. Pat. 2.58.4 and Plut. Cic. 42 merely allude to such a 
speech and do not provide details, and it is not mentioned in App. B Civ. For summaries of 
the source-material for this speech see Millar 1961, 17–18; Fechner 1986, 58 n. 111.
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envy. Cicero encourages the Senate to “relinquish our enmities or jealousies 
(πρὸς ἀλήλους ἔχθρας ἢ φιλονεικίας), or whatever you want to name them, and 
instead return to our former condition of peace, friendship, and concord”.75 
The idea returns later, where Cicero states that it is φιλονεικία that universally 
drives men to civil strife, with the important Republican exempla of Marius, 
Sulla, Cinna, Strabo, Pompeius, and Caesar as proof.76 The preceding decades 
of the ĳirst century BCE, and indeed decades earlier as the exemplum of the 
Gracchi makes clear,77 is reflected upon as an envious contest between indi-
vidual dynasts.
The vocabulary in this instance is slightly different to the lex Gabinia 
speeches: φιλονεικία, rather than φθóνος, is the undesirable aspect of 
Republican political culture most to be abandoned. But while reading Cicero’s 
reflection upon senatorial competition the reader cannot fail to think of the 
assassination of Caesar which occurred a few chapters before. The cause 
of this, Dio states moments prior the Amnesty speech, was φθóνος: “because of 
envy (φθόνῳ) of his advancement and hatred of the honours he had received 
instead of them, a destructive frenzy struck certain men, and they unjustly 
killed him”.78 Were the point not sufĳiciently laboured, the historian reflects a 
chapter later upon the danger of φθóνος, arguing that it is germane to republics 
(δημοκρατία) in general.79 But Dio additionally suggests that the spiteful envy 
that was fatally attached to Caesar was the deliberate creation of the Senate: 
they voted him extravagant honours not in order to gratify him, “but in order 
that he might be the more swiftly destroyed, wishing to make him envied and 
resented all the sooner” (ἔς τε τὸ ἐπίφθονον καὶ ἐς τὸ νεμεσητὸν).80 Dio appears to 
have made a conscious and deliberate choice in the Amnesty speech to bring 
forward the theme of φιλονεικία, and predicates this upon an immediately pre-
ceding narrative in which φθóνος takes centre-stage as a key motive in dynastic 
power-struggles.
These comments on the danger of envy in the speeches are consistent 
with the historian’s interpretation of aristocratic behaviour throughout the 
Late Republic. There are only eight instances of an historical character acting 
75   Cass. Dio 44.24.3.
76   Cass. Dio 44.27.4–28.5.
77   Cass. Dio 44.30.4.
78   Cass. Dio 44.1.1.
79   Cass. Dio 44.2.3.
80   Cass. Dio 44.7.3.
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because of their φθóνος in the half-millennium period prior to the Gracchi.81 
This may be influenced by the lacunose state of Dio’s Regal- to Mid-Republican 
narrative; although the fragments suggest that Dio may have conceived of the 
Mid-Republic as a golden age, at least compared to the decline that followed.82 
In the century between the Gracchi and the reign of Augustus, however, φθóνος 
becomes signiĳicantly more pronounced, especially as the catalyst for hos-
tile individual action. All told, in the period from the Gracchi to the death of 
Augustus (Books 25–55) there are 82 instances of the morpheme -φθον-, indi-
cating envy.83 It is telling that eight of these occur in the narrative of Caesar’s 
assassination and funeral.
This focus upon φθóνος as a causal force in history is particular to Dio 
among our Imperial Greek historians of this period. Causal participles of the 
verb φθονεῖν, the phrase “because of envy” (ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου), and the dative of 
cause (φθόνῳ) appear frequently, but much less so in Plutarch and Appian, who 
place far less emphasis on envy as a factor of history. Cassius Dio thus applies 
a framework of historical causation to the late res publica in which the emo-
tive aspect, the jealous begrudging of another’s success, plays a central role in 
aristocratic discord. The historian accordingly made his speeches of the Late 
Republic consistent with that framework.
Like imperii consuetudo the historian viewed this issue as distinctly Late 
Republican and as the inevitable product of individual power under that con-
stitution. But paradoxically, it was again the absolute power of a single mon-
arch in Augustus which in Dio’s view broke the cycle of competition and envy, 
restoring the elite to relative harmony. The constitutional debate of Agrippa 
and Maecenas serves, again, as the historian’s ĳinal reflection on this problem 
81   Cass. Dio 5 frg. 19; 11 frg. 43.1–2; 14 frg. 57.20; 17 frg. 57.54; 17 frg. 57.62; 19 frg. 63; 21 frg. 70.9; 
22 frg. 74.
82   For a comparison of Dio’s presentation of these two periods, see Kemezis 2014, 104–112. 
As I suggest at Burden-Strevens 2016, 12, there is ample evidence to indicate that the his-
torian in fact broke with idealised traditions of early Rome, and formed a more negative 
interpretation which is distinctive within Roman historiography; see the contributions of 
Lange and Lindholmer in Burden-Strevens & Lindholmer (forthcoming, 2017b).
83   Cass. Dio 25.85.3; 26.89.3; 27.91.1; 27.91.1; 29.98.2; 30–35 frg. 109.10; 36.14.3; 36.24.6; 36.26.1; 
36.26.2; 36.29.2; 36.43.4; 37.23.4; 37.50.6; 38.11.2; 38.11.4; 38.12.7; 38.21.2; 38.36.4; 38.39.2; 
39.25.4; 39.26.1; 39.26.2; 39.37.4; 40.8.1; 40.51.1; 41.28.1; 42.1.3; 42.20.5; 43.12.1; 43.18.3; 44.1.1; 
44.2.3; 44.3.1; 44.7.3; 44.29.3; 44.36.5; 44.36.5; 44.39.2; 44.43.1; 45.4.3; 45.8.1; 45.11.4; 46.8.3; 
46.17.2; 46.55.2; 47.15.4; 47.33.2; 47.38.3; 48.45.6; 49.7.5; 49.18.7; 49.21.1; 49.23.2; 49.41.6; 
51.12.7; 52.2.2; 52.2.2; 52.11.3; 52.15.3; 52.25.4; 52.26.4; 52.30.8; 52.31.4; 52.31.4; 52.33.8; 52.33.9; 
52.33.9; 52.40.2; 53.3.1; 53.6.2; 53.8.6; 53.10.3; 53.23.3; 53.29.6; 54.1.5; 54.12.2; 54.29.3; 54.31.1; 
55.15.1; 55.18.5; 55.24.9.
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in the Late Republic and on the measures necessary to resolve it. In his argu-
ment against monarchy and its associated troubles, Dio’s Agrippa sets out the 
problem:
μὴ θαυμάσῃς, ὦ Καῖσαρ, εἰ μέλω σε ἀποτρέπειν ἀπὸ τῆς μοναρχίας, καίπερ 
πολὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀπολαύσας ἂν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς σοῦ γε αὐτὴν ἔχοντος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
καὶ σοὶ ὠφέλιμος γενήσεσθαι ἔμελε, καὶ πάνυ ἂν αὐτὴν ἐσπούδασα: ἐπειδὴ 
δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον τοῖς τε αὐταρχοῦσι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις σφῶν παρέχεται, ἀλ᾽ οἱ 
μὲν καὶ ἀνεπιφθόνως καὶ ἀκινδύνως πάνθ᾽ ὅσα ἐθέλουσι καρποῦνται, τοῖς δὲ 
καὶ φθόνοι καὶ κίνδυνοι συμβαίνουσιν, οὐ τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ ἴδιον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς 
ἄλοις, ἀλὰ τὸ σὸν τό τε κοινὸν προϊδέσθαι ἐδικαίωσα.
O Caesar, do not be surprised if I try to turn you away from monarchy, 
even if under that system I would acquire many beneĳits from it – or at 
least if you held it. For if it were to be in your interest, I would of course 
desire it very much. But since monarchy does not offer the same beneĳits 
to rulers as to their friends, but the friends can reap the fruit of all the 
beneĳits they wish safely and unenvied and the rulers on the other hand 
get only the jealousies and dangers, I have decided as usual to look not to 
my own interests, but to yours and the common good.84
It may be reading too much into Dio to suggest that Agrippa’s focus on φθóνος 
is especially signiĳicant here: it is among the opening lines of the speech. This 
admonishment against monarchy in fact begins by emphasising a key problem 
of the Republic in its opening words. But even if we do not accept this sig-
niĳicance, the reader knows from all that has come before, and especially from 
Caesar, that this was no empty warning. Agrippa is here being used to articu-
late a very real historical problem in Dio’s reconstruction: by setting himself up 
as monarch, Augustus risked following the same course as previous dynasts of 
the Late Republic invested with great power.
In the historian’s assessment, part of the solution to the problem of φθóνος 
lay in the title that the princeps was to adopt, and indeed in the self-presentation 
of the Augustan regime more generally. In his response to Agrippa’s defence of 
δημοκρατία, Maecenas concludes his list of recommendations for the new con-
stitutional settlement by suggesting, last of all, that Augustus assume the title 
not of “king”, but “imperator” (αὐτοκράτωρ), “so that you may reap the fruit of 
all the reality of kingship, without the envy that comes with the name” (ἄνευ 
84   Cass. Dio 52.2.1.
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τοῦ τῆς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῆς ἐπιφθόνου).85 Perhaps deliberately, Dio book-ended 
the Agrippa-Maecenas debate with φθóνος, both opening and closing the 
controversia with an historical problem endemic in his account of the Late 
Republic. To ensure that the reader is convinced of this argument about 
φθóνος, Dio also places it in the opening lines to Augustus’ recusatio imperii in 
the following book, as one of the speaker’s (false) bases for rejecting absolute 
 power.86 By reiterating the problem of envy as a cause of violence and civil strife 
in the speeches of Agrippa, Maecenas, and Augustus, Dio thus recalls not only 
the destructive influence of φθóνος in the Late Republic, but suggests through 
Maecenas one of the reasons for the success of the Augustan Principate: the 
studious avoidance of the appearance of kingship.87
Dio is more explicit in this regard later. The Romans, he states, “hated the 
name of monarchy so much that they called their rulers neither dictators nor 
kings, nor any other such name”. But since monarchy was in any event neces-
sary, they chose the name imperator, even for rulers who had not conquered in 
battle, “in order that the rulers might seem to have their power not from domi-
nation, but from the laws”. As such, Augustus assumed the title.88 However, in 
22 BCE an enamoured populace gave the now-abolished title of dictator a ĳinal 
attempt, and Dio’s interpretation is revealing:
τὴν δὲ δικτατορίαν οὐ προσήκατο, ἀλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα προσκατερρήξατο, 
ἐπειδὴ μηδένα τρόπον ἄλως σφᾶς ἐπισχεῖν, μήτε διαλεγόμενος μήτε δεόμενος, 
ἠδυνήθη: τήν τε γὰρ ἐξουσίαν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς δικτάτορας ἔχων, 
ὀρθῶς τό τε ἐπίφθονον καὶ τὸ μισητὸν τῆς ἐπικλήσεως αὐτῶν ἐφυλάξατο.
Augustus did not accept the dictatorship, and even rent his clothes when 
he could ĳind no other way to restrain the people, either through speak-
ing to them or begging them. For since he already had power and honour 
well superior to the dictators anyway, he rightly staved off the jealousy and 
the hatred of their title.89
So φθóνος, as the natural result of individual success within a competitive 
governing elite in Dio’s presentation of the Republic, was overcome by a sin-
gle princeps. This princeps had, on the one hand, the authority to reform the 
85   Cass. Dio 52.40.2.
86   Cass. Dio 53.3.1.
87   On which see Wallace-Hadrill 1982.
88   Cass. Dio 53.17.2–4.
89   Cass. Dio 54.1.4–5. In this Dio captures the self-justifying tone of RG 5.
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provincial administration and prevent individuals’ imperii consuetudo from 
precipitating conflict. On the other hand, his avoidance of the appearance of 
kingship remedied the problem of φθóνος. The fora in which the Republican 
elite had attempted to compete – the Senate floor, popular elections and 
assemblies, and the provinces – were not only brought under monarchical 
control, as Dio explains in Book 53. They were brought under the control of a 
monarch who, by avoiding the trappings of kingship which had brought fatal 
φθóνος to Caesar, avoided φθóνος himself, and secured the transition from 
Republic to Principate.
This may explain why the moral problem of φθóνος takes a less promi-
nent role in the later account. The morpheme -φθον-, which occurs 82 times 
in the century from the Gracchi to Augustus’ time (Books 25–55), occurs only 
39 times in the two hundred years which follow (Books 56–80).90 This may 
be a problem of transmission, as the text becomes less secure from the reign 
of Tiberius. But more likely, the historian conceived of φθóνος as a distinctly 
Late Republican issue which, though always inevitable in human nature, was 
especially pervasive and acute in the power-struggles of the ĳirst century BCE. 
In any case, it is clear that in Dio’s interpretation the problem of φθóνος and 
Augustus’ measures to counter it played a signiĳicant role in the decline of Dio’s 
res publica and the success of the new regime. In his speakers of this period – 
Pompeius, Gabinius, Catulus, Cicero, Agrippa, Maecenas, and Augustus – the 
historian found a persuasive means of articulating that problem, and assessing 
its implications in the process of constitutional change.
 Conclusion
Dio’s speeches form a thematic unity which makes clear the interpretative 
skeleton the historian applied to the Late Republic. Of course they served to 
enhance his own self-presentation as an educated elite who could write in 
polished Attic and declaim on a set theme. The studies of Andriy Fomin and 
Brandon Jones in this volume demonstrate that Cassius Dio was very much an 
author of his time, who frequently deployed his rhetorical education and his 
familiarity with Classical texts to assert his παιδεία. Most of all in the speeches. 
But in tandem with this aesthetic aspect, Dio also used these compositions 
90   Cass. Dio 56.35.5; 56.35.6; 56.40.1; 56.40.6; 56.41.4; 57.6.1; 57.18.7; 57.21.5; 58.3.2; 58.14.2; 
59.17.4; 59.27.4; 60.6.7; 60.23.2; 60.27.3; 60.30.5; 62.14.2; 63.28.5; 64.13.3; 66.10.3; 66.16.3; 
66.18.2; 66.21.1; 67.14.3; 68.6.4; 68.15.5; 68.32.5; 69.3.3; 69.4.6; 71.20.2; 75[74].9.3; 75[74].10.3; 
75[74].15.3; 76[75].16.3; 77[76].11.5; 78[77].24.2; 79[78].10.3.
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to reflect upon key historical problems in the Roman Republic. Envy, and the 
trend of celebrated commanders growing accustomed to their own power, are 
repeatedly underlined. This does not seem a coincidence, but rather a con-
scious and deliberate choice on Dio’s part to use his speeches to build a persua-
sive picture of the historical signiĳicance of these issues.
The historian achieved this in a number of ways. Often his method is rather 
simple: for example, placing concerns about φθóνος in the opening lines to 
Agrippa’s oration and then reiterating these in the closing lines of Maecenas’ 
which follows, effectively framing the debate; or having his Catulus explicitly 
posit imperii consuetudo as the cause for Marius and Sulla’s tyranny, using the 
speaker to express clearly his own view.
At other points his use of speeches within this framework is more complex. 
Catulus’ predictions of the ramiĳications of the lex Gabinia – the degenera-
tion of Pompeius’ character through continued authority and the φθóνος the 
lex would bring – are only realised when one looks far beyond the immediate 
context, to Pompeius’ blocked eastern settlement in 60 BCE or the Battle of 
Pharsalus. Agrippa’s defence of δημοκρατία appears another well-constructed 
case. By making his speaker hold forth on the dangers of envy and imperii 
consuetudo within monarchies, the historian merely states all the more clearly 
that these problems were distinctly Late Republican, with all the preceding nar-
rative as proof. This deliberately weak argument serves the historian’s purpose 
of underlining the problems of the Republic and the desirability of monar-
chy. But it also functions in a call-and-response relationship with Maecenas’ 
speech, which underlines the measures necessary to rectify these problems – 
measures which Dio’s later narrative implements. The argumentative purpose 
of the speeches becomes clearer when they are read not only in relation to the 
broader narrative, as Marianne Coudry’s study here shows, but in relation to 
each other. They reveal a more coherent and sophisticated explanation of the 
downfall of the Republic than is generally recognised, and which appears to 
be Dio’s own.
Of course this particular analysis may have been informed by Cassius Dio’s 
own experiences. While it is possible to overstate the historian’s consciousness 
of the looming Crisis of the Third Century,91 Dio himself lived to see ambitious 
commanders again struggle for control of the Roman state. He had been made 
praetor for the following year by the short-lived emperor Pertinax in 193 CE, 
a year which famously boasted no fewer than ĳive emperors. The transition 
from Antonine to Severan, “from a kingdom of gold to one of iron and rust”,92 
91   Rees, W. 2011, 2–5.
92   Cass. Dio 72.36.4. Kemezis 2014, 30–74 provides a clear discussion of this change.
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involved bloodshed. Indeed, his historical project as a whole was inspired by 
a war monograph on Septimius Severus’ campaigns.93 In these contexts, it is 
hard not to imagine that Dio saw similarities between the imperii consuetudo 
of the dynasts of the Late Republic and the generals of his own time who vied 
for supremacy. But even if this is the case, Dio’s evaluation of the causal role 
of imperii consuetudo and φθóνος in the collapse of the Roman Republic merits 
consideration in its own right, divorced from the Severan context, as an histori-
cal interpretation. He may not have been wrong. And how better to persuade 
the audience, than in a speech?
93   Cass. Dio 73[72].23.1–3.
